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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
THE 1986-1987 TERM (PART II)
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead
Professor of Law and Criminal Justice
Case Western Reserve University
This the second of a two-part article on the Supreme
Court's criminal procedure cases decided this Term.

PREVENTIVE DETENTION
For the first time, the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of preventive detention in a criminal trial.
United States v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987). The Bail
Reform Act of 1984 permits a federal court to detain an
arrestee pending trial if the prosecution demonstrates by
clear and convincing evidence, after an adversary hearing, that no release conditions "will reasonably assure
... the safety of any other person and the community."
The Second Circuit had found this provision facially
unconstitutional as violative of "substantive due process." United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986).
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court first addressed the substantive due process issue, i.e., whether
preventive detention authorizes impermissible punishment before trial. This argument depends on whether
preventive detention is punitive or regulatory. The Court
ruled that Congress intended preventive detention to be
regulatory, a purpose it found to be legitimate: "There is
no doubt that preventing danger to the community is a
legitimate regulatory goal." /d. at 2101. In addition, preventive detention was not excessive in relation to this
regulatory goal because the Bail Reform Act carefully
limits the circumstances under which detention may be
sought to the most serious crimes- crimes of violence,
offenses for which the sentence is life imprisonment or
death, serious drug offenses, or certain repeat offenders.
Moreover, the arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention
hearing, and the maximum length of detention is limited.
The Court also believed that the procedural safeguards
required by the Bail Reform Act supported its holding:
Detainees have the right to counsel at the detention
hearing ...They may testify in their own behalf, present information by proffer or otherwise, and cmssexamine witnesses who appear at the hearing .. .The
judicial officer charged with the responsibility of determining the appropriateness of detention is guided by
statutorily enumerated factors, which include the

nature and the circumstances of the charges, the
weight of the evidence, the history and characteristics
of the putative offender, and the danger to the community ... The government must prove its case by clear
and convincing evidence ... Finally, the judicial officer
must include written findings of fact and a written statement of reasons for a decision to detain ... The Act's
review provisions ... provide for immediate appellate
review of the detention decision. /d. at 2104.
The Court next considered an Eighth Amendment
argument, i.e., whether the Act violated the Excessive
Bail Clause. According to the Court, the Clause says
nothing about whether bail must be available; it only
proscribes excessive bail. The right to bail is not absolute. For example, a court may refuse bail in capital cases
or when the defendant presents a threat to the judicial
process by intimidating witnesses. While the Court
acknowledged that the primary function of bail is to safeguard the court's role in adjudicating guilt or innocence,
it rejected "the proposition that the Eighth Amendment
categorically prohibits the government from pursuing
other admittedly compelling interests through the regulation of pretrial release." /d. at 2104.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 107 S.Ct. 1990 (1987), involved
the right to counsel when a conviction is challenged in a
collateral proceeding. In particular, Finley concerned the
application of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
Anders held that when an attorney appointed to represent an indigent defendant on direct appeal finds a case
wholly frivolous:
[H]e should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be
accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the
record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy
of counsel's brief should be furnished the indigent and
time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses;
the court-not counsel-then proceeds, after a full
examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether
the case is wholly frivolous. /d. at 744.

)ublic Defender Hyman Friedman
~uyahoga County Public Defender Office, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113

Telephone (216) 443-7223
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The Supreme Court, however, has·never-heldthat
prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when
mounting a collateral attack. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483, 488 (1969). The Court's cases establish that the
right to appointed counsel extends only to the first appeal
of right. For example, it does not extend to discretionary
appeals. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). Thus, even
though the State had provided a right to counsel in collateral proceedings as a matter of state law, the federal
Constitution, according to the Court in Finley, does not
"dictate the exact form such assistance must assume."
107 S.Ct at 1995. Accordingly, the strict procedural guidelines of Anders were not applicable.

expert, who concluded that the gun was defective and
prone to fire, when hit or dropped, without the trigger
being pulled. The trial court excluded her testimony
because she had been hypnotized, a ruling that was
upheld by the Arkansas Supreme Court. Rock's appeal
focused on her right to testify in her own behalf.
On review, the Supreme Court agreed with Rock's
contention and reversed. The Court began its analysis by
recognizing a right to testify. "At this point in the development of our adversary system, it cannot be doubted that
a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the
witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense." /d.
at 2708. This right is based on due process, the right of
compulsory process, the right to counsel, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Although the Court
recognized the problems associated with hypnoticallyrefreshed testimony, it found the Arkansas per se rule of
inadmissibility to be an arbitrary restriction on the defendant's righUo testify. A less restrictive approach, however, might have satisfied constitutional guarantees: "The
State would be well within its powers if it established
guidelines to aid trial courts in the evaluation of posthypnosis testimony and it may be able to show that testimony in a particular case is so unreliable that exclusion is
justified." /d. at 2714.

BURDEN OF PROOF
Martin v. Ohio, 107 S.Ct. 1098 (1987}, involved the
constitutionality of allocating the burden of persuasion
on self-defense to the defendant. Martin was charged
with aggravated murder and pleaded self-defense. An
Ohio statute provided: "The burden of going forward with
the evidence ofari affirmative defense, and the burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense, is upon the accused." R.C. § 2901.05(A).
Under Ohio law, self-defense is an affirmative defense,
and the trial court instructed the jury accordingly. Martin
argued that placing on her the burden of proving selfdefense violated the Due Process Clause.
On review, the Supreme Court rejected this argument.
In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), thf3 Court had
declared that the Due Process Clause "protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged."ld. at 364. In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977}, the Court ruled that
Winship was not violated where. the state was required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements
of murder, but placed on the defendant the burden of
proving the affirmative defense of extreme emotional
disturbance, which reduced murder to manslaughter.
According to the Court, Patterson controlled. The jury
had been instructed that the prosecution had to establish
the essential elements of aggravated murder beyond a
reasonable doubt. An affirmative defense, whether selfdefense or insanity, is not an essential element of the
charged crime and, thus, the burden of persuasion could
be allocated to the defendant. It did not matter that only
Ohio and South Carolina had chosen to allocate this
burden to the defendant.

IMPEACHMENT OF VERDICTS
The defendants in Tanner v. United States, 107 S.Ct.
2739(1987), were convicted of mail fraud and conspiracy
to defraud the United States. After the verdict, the
defense counsel received an unsolicited telephone call
from a juror, who stated that several of the jurors consumed alcohol during the lunch breaks, which caused
them to sleep through the afternoons. In a post-verdict
hearing, the trial court refused to admit the testimony
concerning juror intoxication. A later affidavit by a
second juror described further episodes of intoxication
as well as marijuana and cocaine use. The defendants
argued that the trial court's action violated Federal
Evidence Rule 606(b) and the right to trial by jury.
The Supreme Court disagreed. By the turn of the
century, the firmly established common law rule flatly
prohibited the admission of juror testimony to impeach a
verdict. The rule was intended to encourage freedom of
deliberation, finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors
against harassment. An exception for situations of
"extraneous influence," however, was eventually recognized. Thus, a juror could testify about the reading of
prejudicial newspaper accounts in the juryroom. In
contrast, misunderstandings about jury instructions were
considered "internal" to the jury deliberation process
and thus not subject to juror testimony. The externalinternal distinction is codified in Federal Rule 606(b}.
According to the Court, the legislative history of this rule
clearly established that juror drunkenness was not
considered an external influence. In addition, the Court
found that the allegations about juror intoxication did not
violate the defendants' right to trial by an impartial and
competent jury.

HYPNOTICALLY-REFRESHED TESTIMONY
Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S.Ct. 2704 (1987), involved the
admissibility of testimony of a defendant whose memory
had been refreshed through hypnosis. Rock was
charged with the death of her husband. She told the
police that her husband had attacked her, at which time
she had picked up a gun. When he hit her again, she
shot him. Because she could not remember the precise
details of the incident, her attorney suggested that she
submit to hypnosis. After hypnosis, she recalled that she
did not have her finger on the trigger at the time the
weapon discharged. She also recalled that the weapon
fired when her husband grabbed her. Based on this information, her attorney had the gun examined by a firearms

RELEASE-DISMISSAL AGREEMENTS
Bernard Rumery was charged with tampering with a
witness. The charges arose from Rumery's conversa-
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daughter. CYS claimed the records were privileged under
state law, and the trial court refused to order disclosure.
Ritchie was convicted and appealed. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ruled that the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses required full access to the records.
On review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Ritchie claimed that denying him access to the
records interfered with his right to cross-examine his
daughter at trial. A plurality of the Court rejected this
argument:
The opinions of this Court show that the right of
confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent
improper restrictions on the types of questions that
defense counsel may ask during cross-examination
...The ability to question adverse witnesses, however,
does not include the power to require the pretrial
disclosure of any and all information that might be
useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony. Normally the right to confront one's accusers is satisfied if
defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial toquestion witnesses. /d. at 999.
In addition, the Court preferred to evaluate Ritchie's
claim under a due process, rather than a compulsory
process, analysis. Due process requires the prosecution
to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment.
"Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682
(1985). Although the state's interest in confidentiality is
strong, this interest does not necessarily mean that
disclosure should be precluded in all circumstances. If
material to a criminal defendant's defense, the records
should be disclosed. Consequently, the case was
remanded: "Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file
reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it
contains information that probably would have changed
the outcome of his trial." 107 S.Ct. at 1002.
The Court, however, did not believe that the defense
attorney had a right to examine the records. The defendant's interest in a fair trial can be protected by an in
camera review by the trial court. Full disclosure to the
defense would "sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting its child abuse
information:' /d. at 1003.
Justice Blackmun, who cast the decisive vote, wrote a
concurring opinion. He disagreed that the Confrontation
Clause protects only trial rights and has no relevance to
pretrial discovery: "In my view, there might well be a
confrontation violation if, as here, a defendant is denied
pretrial access to information that would make possible
effective cross-examination of a crucial prosecution
witness." /d. at 1004.

tions with a woman who had allegedly been sexually
assaulted by a friend of Rumery. The substance of the
conversations was disputed, and Rumery's attorney told
_ the prosecutor that if the charges were not dismissed,
1 Rumery would win the case and then sue. The prosecu" tor and Rumery subsequently entered into an agreement
under which the charges would be dropped and Rumery
would release any claims he had against the town, its
officials, or the victim. Although the charges were dropped pursuant to this agreement, Rumery brought a §
1983 action against the town and its officials, alleging a
violation of his constitutional rights. Relying on the
release-dismissal agreement, the defendants moved to
dismiss the suit. Rumery argued that the agreement was
against public policy. The First Circuit accepted this
argument and adopted a per se rule invalidating releasedismissal agreements.
On review, the Supreme Court reversed: "[A]Ithough
we agree that in some cases these agreements may
infringe important interests of the criminal defendant and
of society as a whole, we do not believe that the mere
possibility of harm to these interests calls for a per se
rule." Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S.Ct. 1187, 1192
(1987). First, such agreements are not inherently coercive. Criminal defendants are often required to make difficult choices that effectively waive constitutional rights.
Plea bargaining is an example. At the time he signed the
agreement, Rumery was not in jail and was represented
by counsel. He waited three days to make a decision.
Second, while such agreements may tempt prosecutors
to bring frivolous charges in reaction to a civil rights
. claim, this possibility should not lead to the prohibition of
/ all release-dismissal agreements. Finally, the prosecutor
offered a valid reason for entering into the agreementto protect the alleged victim from the public scrutiny and
embarrassment she would have endured if she had had
to testify in the criminal and civil cases. The Court wrote:
In sum, we conclude that this agreement was voluntary, that there is no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, and that enforcement of this agreement would
not adversely affect the relevant public interests. /d. at
1195.
Justice O'Connor, who cast the decisive vote, wrote a
concurring opinion. She agreed that a case-by-case
approach, rather than a per se rule, was appropriate in
this context. Her disagreement with the Court is summarized in the following passage:
The defendants in a§ 1983 suit may establish that a
particular release executed in exchange for the
dismissal of criminal charges was voluntarily made,
not the product of prosecutorial overreaching, and in
the public interest. But they must prove that this is so;
the courts should not presume it as I fear portions of
... the Court's opinion may imply. /d. at 1197.
DISCOVERY
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 107 S.Ct. 989 (1987), involved
a criminal defendant's right of access to confidential files.
·, Ritchie was charged with the sexual assault of his
' 13-year-old daughter. The Children and Youth Services
(CYS), a protective service agency, investigated the incident. During pretrial discovery, Ritchie served CYS with a
subpoena seeking access to the records concerning his

DEATH PENALTY
Mandatory Capital Punishment
The Court examined the constitutionality of mandatory
capital punishment in Sumner v. Shuman, 107 S.Ct. 2716
(1987). Shuman was sentenced under a statute that
mandated the death penalty for a prison inmate who is
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convicted ofmurder while serving a life sentence without
the possibility of parole. In prior cases the Court had
reserved judgment on this issue.
In Shuman the Court gave its answer. Mandatory death
sentences violate the Eighth Amendment proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment. The statute was
deficient for two reasons. First, it precluded the consideration of any mitigating circumstances, about either the
prison murder or the predicate offense which resulted in
the life-term. "Without consideration of the nature of the
predicate life-term offense and the circumstances
surrounding the commission of that offense, the label
'life-term inmate' reveals little about the inmate's record
or character." /d. at 2725.
Second, a mandatory capital-sentencing procedure
does not necessarily increase deterrence. Even without a
mandatory penalty, an inmate convicted of a prison murder runs the risk that the death penalty will be imposed
under the State's guided-discretion capital statute.

second, the culpable mental state. As for the requisite
mental state, the Court found "intent to kill" a too restrictive criterion. '[R]eckless indifference to the value of
human life may be every bit as shocking to the moral
sense as an 'intent to kill.' " 107 S.Ct. at 1688. Accordingly, ·
·~major participation in the felony committed, combined
with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to
satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement." /d.
Racial Discrimination
The defendant in McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S.Ct. 1756
(19"a7), challenged the imposition of his death sentence
based on a statistical study that showed that the death
penalty was imposed in Georgia more often on black
defendants and killers of white victims than on white
defendants and killers of black victims. The study examined over 2,000 murder cases that occurred during the
1970s. "The raw numbers ... indicate that defendants
charged with killing white persons received the death
penalty in 11% of the cases, but defendants charge_d with
killing blacks received the death penalty in only 1% of the
cases." /d. at 1763. When the race of the victim and the
race of the defendant were considered together, the
study showed the following:
[T]he death penalty was assessed in 22% of the cases
involving black defendants and white victims; 8% of
the cases involving white defendants and white
victims; 1% of the cases involving black defendants
and black victims; and 3% of the cases involving white
defendants and black victims. /d.
Based on this study, McCleskey challenged his sentence on equal protection, as well as cruel and unusual
punishment, grounds. The Supreme Court rejected both.
The Court began its equal protection analysis by noting
that the defendant had to prove a discriminatory purpose
in his case. He offered no specific evidence of such.
Instead, he relied solely on the statistical study. Although
the Court had relied on statistical evidence in other
areas, such as jury selection, it believed that the nature
of the capital sentencing decision was different: "Each
jury is unique in its composition, and the Constitution
requires that its decision rest on consideration of innumerable factors that vary according to the characteristics of the individual defendant and the facts of the
particular capital offense." /d. at 1767. Moreoyer, the
Court viewed discretion as an integral part of the
sentencing system and thus demanded stronger
evidence than that provided by the statistical study:
Implementation of these [murder] laws necessarily
requires discretionary judgments. Because discretion
is essential to the criminal justice process, we would
demand exceptionally clear proof before we would
infer that the discretion has been abused. The unique
nature of the decisions at issue in this case also counsel against adopting such an inference from the
disparities indicated by the [statistical] study. Accord- ·
ingly, we hold that the ... study is clearly insufficient
to support an inference that any of the decision makers
in McCleskey's case acted with discriminatory
purpose. /d. at 1769.
Next, the Court considered McCleskey's Eighth
Amendment argument- that the Georgia system was
arbitrary and capricious in its application due to the

Accomplice Liability
Tison v. Arizona, 107 S.Ct. 1676 (1987), involved the
constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on defendants who neither intended to kill the victims nor inflicted
the fatal wounds. Gary Tison was serving a life sentence
for murder when his three sons helped him and a cellmate, another convicted murderer, escape. Later, they
flagged down a passing car. The occupants included a
father, mother, two-year old son, and a niece. Tison and
the cellmate killed all four. His sons were apparently
surprised by the shootings. One son died in a roadblock
shootout, and Gary Tison escaped into the desert where
he subsequently died of exposure. The cellmate and two
remaining sons were tried on capital charges. Convicted
under accomplice liability andfelony"murder statutes,
each defendant was subsequently sentenced to death
and appealed.
The focus of the appeal was the Supreme Court's decision in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). In that
case the Court had reversed a death sentence imposed
under Florida's felony-murder rule. Enmund had been
the getaway driver in an armed robbery of a dwelling. His
accomplice had killed an elderly couple when they resisted the robbery. The Court found the death penalty disproportionate to the crime of robbery-felony murder in
these circumstances, because Enmund's participation in
the murders was too tangential. The Court did not
believe that "the threat that the death penalty will be
imposed for murder will measurably deter one who does
not kill and has no intention or purpose that life will be
taken." /d. at 798-99.
The Tison brothers argued that Enmund controlled.
The Supreme Court disagreed. According to the Court,
that case concerned only the two extremes. At one pole
was someone like Enmund who was a minor actor, not at
the scene, and who neither intended to kill nor was found
to have had any culpable mental state. At the other pole
was the felony-murderer who actually killed or intended
to kill. The Tison brothers' cases fell somewhere
between these two poles. In determining whether the
death penalty was proportional for killings that fell
between these extremes, the Court focused on two
factors: first, the degree of participation in the felony, and
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were irrelevant to the decision to kill. This evidence
thus could divert the jury's attention away from the
defendant's background and record, and the circumstances of the crime. 107 S.Ct. at 2534.
In addition, the VIS introduces an arbitrary element into
the decision-making process. The relatives in Booth were
articulate in expressing their grief. Other victims, however, may not leave behind any relatives, or the family
members may be inarticulate. "The fact that the imposition of the death sentence may turn on such distinctions
illustrates the danger of allowing juries to consider this
information." /d. Finally, the Court was concerned how
the defendant might rebut such evidence; the Court
feared a mini-trial on the victim's character, which would
distract the jury from its central task.

influence of racial considerations. Again, the Court rejected his argument. The Court first noted the safeguards
against racial prejudice that it had required in the jury
selection process. It also emphasized once more the role
of discretion and its value to defendants in the criminal
justice system. Measured against these protections and
values, the statistical study prove insufficient:
In light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial
bias in the process, the fundamental value of jury trial
in our criminal justice system, and the benefits that
discretion provides to criminal defendants, we hold
that the ... study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital-sentencing process. /d. at 1778.

Mitigating Circumstances
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has held that
the sentencer in a capital case "may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering 'any relevant
mitigating evidence.'" Skipper v. South Carolina, 106
S.Ct. 1669, 1671 (1986) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982)(plurality opinion). The issue
again came before the Court in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 107
S.Ct. 1821 (1987). At the sentencing phase of trial, the
defendant introduced evidence of his family background
and capacity for rehabilitation. The Florida statute in
effect at the time, however, listed specific mitigating
factors. The judge's instruction to an advisory jury indicated that only those factors were relevant. Since the
judge refused to consider the evidence of nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances, the Court reversed the death
sentence.

Sympathy Instruction
The defendant in California v. Brown, 107 S.Ct. 837
(1987), challenged a jury instruction on sympathy, which
was given during the penalty phase of his capital case.
Brown was found guilty of rape and first degree murder.
In the penalty phase, the prosecution presented
evidence that the defendant had raped another girl on a
prior occasion. The defense presented family members
and a psychiatrist. The trial court instructed the jury to
consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and to weigh them in determining the appropriate penalty. The court also cautioned the jury that it "must not be
swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy,
passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling."
Brown was sentenced to death. The California Supreme
Court reversed on constitutional grounds.
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. According to the Court, its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
established two prerequisites to the imposition of the
death penalty. First, sentencers may not be given unbridled discretion in imposing capital punishment. See
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Second, a capital
defendant generally must be allowed to introduce any
relevant mitigating evidence regarding his character,
record, or the circumstances of the offense. See Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). The Court held that the
"instruction given by the trial court in this case violates
neither of these constitutional principles." 107 S.Ct. at 839.
The Court believed that the California Supreme Court
had improperly focused solely on the word "sympathy."
The instruction cautioned against being swayed by
"mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." The Court
believed that reasonable jurors would not focus only on
the phrase "mere sympathy:• and if they did, they "would
likely interpret the phrase as an admonition to ignore
emotional responses that are not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating evidence introduced during the penalty phase." /d. at 840. The Court added:
An instruction prohibiting juries from basing their
sentencing decisions on factors not presented at the
trial, and irrelevant to the issues at the trial, does not
violate the United States Constitution. It serves the
useful purpose of confining the jury's imposition of the
death sentence by cautioning it against reliance on
extraneous emotional factors, which, we think, would

Victim Impact Statements
Booth v. Maryland, 107 S.Ct. 2529 (1987), presented
the question whether the Constitution prohibits a jury
from considering a "victim impact statement" (VIS)
during capital sentencing proceedings. The Court held
that it did.
Booth was convicted of first-degree murder in the
deaths of an elderly couple. Under Maryland statutory
law, the VIS is part of the presentence report and may be
read to the jury during the sentencing phase of a trial.
The VIS in Booth's case was based on interviews with the
victims' son, daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter.
Parts of the VIS emphasized the victims' outstanding
personal qualities. Other parts disclosed the severe
emotional and personal problems the family members
had faced as a result of the crime. The VIS was read to
the jury, and they sentenced Booth to death.
The Court ruled that the information in the VIS was
irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision, and that its
admissibility created the risk that the death penalty
would be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously. In carrying
out its task, "the jury is required to focus on the defendant as a uniquely individual human bein[g]." Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). The VIS,
however, focuses on the victim and the effect of the crime
on his family, factors that may be wholly unrelated to the
blameworthiness of the particular defendant.
Allowing the jury to rely on a VIS therefore could result
in imposing the death sentence because of factors
about which the defendant was unaware, and that
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ular case." /d. at 1770.

be farmore likely to turn the jury against a capital
defendant than for him. /d.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

E

Death-Qualified Juries
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the
Court held that a capital defendant's right to an impartial
jury under the Sixth Amendment prohibited the exclusion
of venire members "simply because they voiced general
objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction." /d. at
522. Exclusion shoJ.Jid be3 limited only to those who were
"irrevocably committed ... to vote agalnsfi~e-death
penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances that
might emerge in the course of the proceedings," and to
those whose views would prevent them from making an
impartial decision on the question of guilt/d. at 522 n.21.
See also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). In Davis
v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976), the Court held that when
a trial court misapplies Witherspoon and excludes from a
capital jury a prospective juror who in fact is qualified to
serve, a death sentence imposed by that jury cannot
stand. Gray v. Mississippi, 107 S.Ct. 2045 (1987), presented the question whether Davis should be abandoned in
favor of a harmless-error analysis. The Court reaffirmed
Davis, again rejecting a harmless-error analysis in this
context:
Because the Witherspoon-Witt standard is rooted in the
constitutional right to an impartial jury, ... and because
the impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very
integrity of the legal system, the ... harmless- error
analysis can,ot apply. We have recognized that "some
constitutional rights.[are] so basic to a fair trial that
their infraction can never be treated as harmless
error."...The righUOJ~Dl1JJPfll1i§l<!qjycjic~tor, be it
judge or jury, is such a right. /d. at 2056-57.
Buchanan v. Kentucky, 107 S.Ct. 2906 (1987}, also
focused on death-qualified juries. Buchanan, along with
an accomplice, was charged with capital murder. They
were tried together. The trial court granted a defense
motion to dismiss the capital portion of the indictment
because Buchanan was not the triggerman and had not
intended to kill. Both defendants were convicted; the
codefendant received the death penalty. Buchanan
claimed that trial by a death-qualified jury deprived him
of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury selected
from a fair cross-section of the community.
The Supreme Court disagreed. According to the Court,
Buchanan's claim was foreclosed by Lockhart v. McCree,
106 S.Ct. 1758 (1986}, in which the Court had held that
"death qualification" prior to the guilt phase of the trial
did not violate the fair cross-section requirement. That
requirement applied only to venires, not to petit juries.
Moreover, "Witherspoon-excludables" did not constitute
a distinctive group for fair cross-section purposes. In
sum, McCree concluded that "the Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross section of the
community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so long as
the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out
their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the partie-

Broken Plea Agreement
The defendant in Ricketts v. Adamson, 107 S.Ct. 2680
(1987}, was charged with first degree murder in the death
of Donald Bolles, a reporter for the Arizona Republican.
He pleaded guilty to second degree murder pursuant to a
plea bargain, in which he agreed to testify against two
other defendants. The agreement provided that "[s]hould
the defendant refuse to testify or should he at any time
tesfityunlrutnflilly ... then this entire agreement is null
and void and the original charge will be automatically
reinstated:' The trial court accepted the plea but withheld sentencing. Adamson testified against the other ·
defendants, who were convicted of first degree murder.
He was then sentenced. The convictions of the other
defendants, however, were reversed on appeal, and
Adamson refused to testify at the retrial. He claimed that
his obligation to testify under the agreement ended when
he was sentenced. The prosecution considered his
refusal to testify as a breach of the agreement, and
Adamson was subsequently tried, convicted of first
degree murder, and sentenced to death. In a federal
habeas proceeding, the federal appellate court ruled that
his double jeopardy rights had been violated.
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court acknowledged that absent special circumstances, the Double
Jeopardy Clause would bar prosecution for first degree
murder because second degree murder was a lesser
included offense. According to the Court, the special
~
circumstances were Adamson's waiver of his double
jeopardy claim. The Court believed the agreement was
clear; should Adamson not testify after pleading guilty to
second degl'eemurder, the agreement was void, and he
could be tried for first degree murder. This agreement
necessarily involves a waiver of double jeopardy rights.
Reversal After Appeal
Montana v. Hall, 107 S.Ct. 1825 (1987), involved a retrial
after a successful appeal. Hall was convicted of incest of
his stepdaughter and appealed. During the appellate
process, the State discovered that the incest statute had
not applied to stepchildren at the time of the crime. An
amendment, which included stepchildren, became effective three months after the incident in question. The State
brought the issue to the attention of the Montana Supreme
Court, which reversed Hall's conviction on ex post facto
grounds. The court also concluded that a retrial for sexual assault was precluded because incest and sexual
assault were the "same offense" for double jeopardy
purposes.
On review the Supreme Court reversed per curiam.
Under the Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence, the
successful appeal of a judgment of conviction, on any
ground other than the sufficiency of the evidence, does
not bar further proceedings for the same offense. Since
Hall's conviction was reversed on ex post facto grounds,
rather than for insufficient evidence, a retrial on the sexual assault charge was permissible.
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